Internal Police Accountability

Responsible police leadership

1. The Constitution and police laws must entrench robust checks in the procedure to appoint and remove the Inspector-General of Police, in order to ensure the independence and impartiality of the Police Force.
2. The Constitution should state that the Parliament should approve the candidate for Inspector-General of Police before the person is appointed by the President.
3. Selection criteria must be developed and integrated into the Police Act.
4. The Constitution should clearly set out the grounds upon which the Inspector-General may be removed, to ensure transparency and accountability in any such decision, with provision for parliamentary involvement in any attempt to remove the Inspector-General before the conclusion of his or her term of office.
5. The Constitution should stipulate a fixed term of office for the Inspector-General of Police. It is recommended that the Constitution should allow for an initial term of four years, renewable once for a maximum tenure of eight years.

Internal regulations

1. Police General Orders should be revised to bring them in conformity with policing laws and to reflect other recommendations pertaining to the internal accountability.
2. The Police Force Service Regulations, 1995 should be abolished in order to simplify the internal regulations regime. Any relevant provisions worth keeping should be transplanted into Police General Orders.
3. Police Code of Conduct should be made public and widely available both to the police and the members of the public.
4. SARPCCO Code of Conduct should be formally integrated into internal regulations and made available to the police and members of the public.

Internal reporting

1. The law should strengthen internal reporting system by obliging the police to record and report the following occurrences: arrests and detentions; granted and refused bails; searches; time, place and duration of interrogations, as well as the facts of confessions and statements; the fact of detainee’s medical examination; and the use of firearms.
2. Formalise internal channels for reporting human rights violations by police officers as follows:
   1. The scope of what constitutes human rights violations must be properly defined and circulated throughout the police department;
   2. It should be clearly stated to which rank of officer complaints can be brought; If no action taken, the complainant should be able to complain to the internal discipline unit or external oversight agency;
   3. The complainant must not suffer any kind of reprisal or punishment for reporting human rights violations.

Internal disciplinary mechanisms

1. Establish a single internal disciplinary unit and provide for its composition, powers, procedures as well as financing in Tanzania Police Force and Auxiliary Services Act;
   1. The unit should have the power to investigate suo moto;
   2. The unit should report directly to the IGP or Deputy IGP;
   3. The procedures for appointment, transfer and removal of the head of internal disciplinary unit should be specified in Tanzania Police Force and Auxiliary Services Act;
2. Delineate cases of disciplinary misconduct that are dealt with by superiors and cases that are dealt with by the internal disciplinary unit;
3. Simplify the accountability system by unifying procedures for different ranks, except for the three highest ranks;
4. Provide for a possibility to register a complaint against the police at any police station in Tanzania Police Force and Auxiliary Services Act;
5. Develop a standard Complaint Form with a receipt for complainants, to enable complainants to have evidence of their complaint and details of the police officer who took to the complaint;
6. Enshrine the obligation to register a complaint against the police in Tanzania Police Force and Auxiliary Services Act. Refusing or failing to register a complaint should be a disciplinary offence;
7. All complaints lodged with the police should be forwarded to the internal disciplinary unit to investigate, with a copy sent to the external civilian oversight body;
8. The public and police officers should be made aware of the official channels of registering complaints against the police;
9. Provide for anonymity and, when necessary, witness protection for complainants;
10. Enshrine an obligation to provide a receipt of complaint to the complainant in Tanzania Police Force and Auxiliary Services Act;

Performance evaluation and promotions

1. Establish a Police Force Service Commission in the Constitution.
2. Establish a separate law to govern the Police Force Service Commission; or amend the Police Force and Prisons Service Commission Act, 1990 in line with the recommendations below.
3. The composition of the Commission must be diverse and ensure a balance between government and non-government members.
4. Members should be appointed through an open, competitive and transparent process, based on objective selection criteria, by the President subject to confirmation by the Parliament.
5. The Commission must be proactive in providing accessible and accurate information and data on its functions, duties, powers and composition in the public domain, through various mediums including the Internet.

Accountability to the state

Accountability to the Political Executive

1. Law and policy should clearly delineate the roles, responsibilities, and relationship between the police and the Executive.
2. The Executive must always act to respect the operational responsibility of the police. The MHA’s Complaints Handling Unit should be disbanded. It is not appropriate for any police complaints unit to be situated in or governed by any Ministry of government.

Accountability to the Parliament

1. The Parliament should take a leading role in revising police legislation to strengthen existing accountability mechanisms and create new ones, such as independent civilian oversight over the police.
2. The Parliament should amend or repeal sections of the statutes that grant immunity to police officers, in particular:
   1. Sections 29(6) & 33(8) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002;
   2. Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1962;
   3. Section 26 of the Emergency Powers Act, 1986;
   4. Section 78 of the Penal Code, 1981;
   5. Section 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1985.
3. The Members of Parliament are encouraged to actively engage the police and the responsible Minister during question-and-answer sessions, and within the Defence and Security Committee and Public Accounts Committee.

Accountability to the Judiciary

1. The Judiciary is encouraged to take a more pro-active stance on police accountability and contribute to the process of police reform by issuing orders and/or guidelines on specific issues.

Accountability to community

Community policing

1. Establish and define community policing in Tanzania Police Force and Auxiliary Services Act.
2. Adopt a community policing policy and its implementation strategy, outlining goals, targets and specific initiatives.
3. Devolve community policing in order to let police officers at ward, village and district levels have operational discretion to adapt community policing programmes and strategies to their respective jurisdictions.
4. Establish institutionalised community policing forums to supplement ad hoc community policing initiatives and enhance police engagement with civil society;
5. Develop plans and strategies to phase out people’s militias to replace them with / integrate into Tanzania Police Force.

Responsiveness to civil society

1. Establish regular engagement and dialogue between the TPF and civil society, as defined in the TPFRP, through community policing forums, civil society platforms like Haki na Usalama Forum, academic institutions, as well as media and legal professionals associations like Tanganyika Law Society.

External oversight

1. The police should fully cooperate with existing oversight bodies, such as PCCB and CHRAGG and be held to account for any instances of non-cooperation.
2. An independent civilian oversight body should be created that investigates allegations of serious misconduct by the police. Key requirements for an effective a body include:
   1. Establish a robust and independent selection process, based on objective criteria, to appoint the Chair and members;
   2. Ensure all appointments are approved by Parliament, and there is no scope for political appointees;
   3. Can take complaints against the police from members of the public and investigate;
   4. Can initiate an investigation into police action on its own initiative (suo moto);
   5. Mandated to investigate deaths and serious injuries that may have been caused by police action.
   6. Mandated to investigate all deaths and serious injuries caused in police custody.
   7. Given sufficient investigatory powers.
   8. Empowered to make binding recommendations for action including prosecution, discipline or policy review.
   9. Charged with reporting regularly to Parliament and the public.
   10. Ensured adequate resources and an autonomous budget
3. Independent civilian oversight body should be publicly supported by the government and the police.

Appropriate legal framework

The legal framework must explicitly define the specific roles of the police and the political executive. We recommend the following language to be adopted:

1. The supervision, direction and control of the police throughout the State should, be vested on the Inspector-General of Police (the formulation in the second draft Constitution provides a good example).
2. The Inspector-General of Police should be responsible to the Minister for
   1. carrying out the functions and duties of the Police;
   2. the general conduct of the Police;
   3. the effective, efficient, and economical management of the Police;
   4. tendering advice to the Minister;
   5.  giving effect to any lawful ministerial directions.
3. The Inspector-General of Police should not be responsible to, and must act independently of the Minister regarding:
   1. the maintenance of order in relation to any individual or group of individuals;
   2. the enforcement of the law in relation to any individual or group of individuals;
   3. the investigation of offences; and
   4. decisions about individual Police officers.
4. The Minister may give the Inspector-General of Police directions in writing on matters of Government policy.
5. No direction from the Minister to the Inspector-General of Police should have the effect of requiring non-enforcement of a particular area of law.
6. The Minister or any other person must not give directions to the Inspector-General of Police in relation to the following:
   1. enforcement of the criminal law in particular cases and classes of cases;
   2. matters that relate to an individual or group of individuals; and
   3. decisions on individual members of the police.

Independent police Leadership

The Constitution and police laws must entrench robust checks in the procedure to appoint and remove the Inspector-General of Police, in order to ensure the independence and impartiality of the Police Force:

1. The Constitution should state that the Parliament should approve the candidate for Inspector-General of Police before the person is appointed by the President.
2. Selection criteria must be developed and integrated into the Police Act. We suggest that a person is qualified for the position of Inspector-General of Police if the person:
   1. Is a Tanzanian citizen;
   2. Holds degree from a university recognised in Tanzania;
   3. Demonstrates the length of service and range of experience required;
   4. Meets the requirements of professionalism and integrity;
   5. Has never been indicted in a disciplinary proceeding or convicted of any criminal offence;
   6. Has served in the Police Force for at least fifteen years and has knowledge and experience in matters relating to any of the following disciplines:
      1. Criminal justice;
      2. Policy development and implementation;
      3. Finance and public administration;
      4. Strategic management;
      5. Security;
      6. Law;
      7. Sociology; or
      8. Government.

3. The Constitution should clearly set out the grounds upon which the Inspector-General may be removed, to ensure transparency and accountability in any such decision. South African model serves as a good example in this regard, but ideally there should be provision for parliamentary involvement in any attempt to remove the Inspector-General before the conclusion of his or her term of office.
4. As well as security of tenure, the Constitution should stipulate a fixed term of office for the Inspector-General of Police. With job security, the head of the Police Service is more likely to prioritise the rule of law and the interests of the Tanzanian people over the demands of powerful individuals outside the regular chain of command. It is recommended that the Constitution should allow for an initial term of four years, renewable once for a maximum tenure of eight years.
5. Recognistion by the law of newly and recently established departments in the Police Force. Such include the Forensic Bureau among others so as to give their undertakings the force of law and enforceability and admissibility of their products.

Independent, transparent and fair management of police

An independently functioning, effective Police Force Service Commission is required to ensure independence and impartiality in police employment matters, discipline, training and professional standards. The Constitution should reflect the recommendations set out below:

3. Establish a Police Force Service Commission in the Constitution.
4. A separate law to govern the Police Force Service Commission should be drafted and passed. Alternatively, reform the Police Force and Prisons Service Commission Act, 1990 in line with the recommendations below.
5. Commission’s members should be appointed through open, competitive and transparent process by the President subject to confirmation by the Parliament.
6. The Commission should consist of:
   1. A person qualified to be appointed as a High Court Judge;
   2. The Inspector-General of Police;
   3. One junior and one senior police officers in service;
   4. One representative each of
      1. organised women interest groups;
      2. Tanganyika Law Society;
      3. Zanzibar Law Society;
      4. non-governmental human rights organisations in Tanzania; and
      5. organised Private Sector.
   5. Other qualified candidates of integrity who have had a distinguished career;
7. In addition to establishing the Commission, the Constitution should state the broad functions of the Commission as follows:
   1. Oversee the recruitment and appointment of members of the police;
   2. Oversee the management of other employment matters, including deciding promotions, demotions, transfers, dismissals;
   3. Oversee internal discipline of the police service;
   4. Oversee police training; and
   5. Oversight and entrenchment of professional standards;
8. The public should be confident in the Commission. To this end the Commission should develop internal strategies and mechanisms on how to publicise and otherwise handle the information about Commission’s work.
   

Adequate financial resources

The Constitution or the Police Act should have clear regulations regarding adequate police funding. The law should stipulate sources of police’s financing. They should include state budget allocations and lawful donations. They also may include income from police’s services and interest from police’s projects, following Rwandese model.

At the same time, it should be spelled out that it is the responsibility of the Inspector-General of Police and the Minister for Home Affairs to ensure police headquarters, zonal, regional, units, districts, and stations are allocated sufficient funds to finance its activities.

1. Police should be properly remunerated, have adequate housing and other facilities.
2. Proper equipment should be provided.
3. Independent and adequate forensics (could be housed at a hospitals) must be provided for proper investigations.

1. Detention must be affected on grounds that are clearly established in law and which accord with international standards for detention, and must not be motivated by discrimination of any kind.
   Detention should be an exception rather than a rule and for as short a time period as possible. Police and the justice system broadly, must observe procedural safeguards.
2. Detention of persons awaiting trial should only be as a last resort and for the shortest time possible.
3. Pre-trial detention should be reduced by:
   1. improved access to bail through widening police powers of bail and involving community representatives in the bail process;
   2. ensuring the time in police custody is maintained at 24 hours; and
   3. setting time limits for people on remand in prison.

1. Ensure pre-trial detainees are held separately to those sentenced, and that women are held separately to men.
2. Improve the juvenile justice system and ensure separation of juveniles from adults in detention.

1. Encourage alternative mechanisms to prison such as community services or community housing
2. Encourage restorative justice and other alternatives to jail for juvenile offenders

1. Improve conditions in Tanzania’s prisons and other places of detention (police cells), including in relation to overcrowding and inadequate health care.
2. The conditions in places of detention must accord with the right to life and treatment with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.
3. Ensure adequate sunlight, outdoor space, hygienic toilet and washing facilities.
4. Detainees must have the right to protection from torture and ill-treatment.
5. Detainees must have access to health and legal services as required.
6. Improve access to education, religious and other services.
7. Provide improved access to services and to the common areas for prisoners sentenced to death (often locked in a dormitory for long periods of the day, without access to education, religious or other services).

1. Prison officials, especially senior officials, should be appointed by an independent body such as a Prison Commission – as long as such a Commission is truly independent from political influence.